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THE UNITED STATES IS DEVELOPING MISSILE DEFENSES THATwill offer some protection against ballistic missile warheadslaunched against North America.1 The decision to deploy a mod-
est national missile defense has already been made—it was signed into
law in 1999. At that time, President William Clinton announced that imple-
menting this decision would depend on an assessment of the nature of the
threat, the technological capabilities of the system, its cost, and the im-
pact on relations with allies and potential adversaries. While the goals of
these limited defenses are modest, the U.S. effort to deploy a national or
global missile defense system constitutes a major departure in U.S. de-
fense strategy and may lead to unforeseen and, in some instances,
unwelcome international political consequences. Since the United States
and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on
26 May 1972, Americans have relied on the threat of nuclear retaliation
to deter missile attacks against the United States. Faced with emerging
threats produced by the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles that
can be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads, however,
the idea of supplementing deterrence by using active defenses to destroy
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incoming warheads is gaining do-
mestic political support within the
United States. Americans can ex-
pect to have some form of national
missile defense by the end of the
decade.
To take a fresh look at the mis-
sile defense issue, we assumed the
United States will deploy missile
defenses and has either modified
or abandoned the ABM Treaty. We
then estimated how these changes
might affect policies and politics
globally. By assuming the United
States will soon deploy missile
defenses, we do not suggest that
critics of U.S. national missile de-
fense (NMD) are necessarily
incorrect, that new technologies
will work flawlessly, or that only
positive developments will flow
from the deployment of missile
defenses. Instead, we believe that
by imagining deployments have
already occurred, we could begin
to identify the unanticipated or
unintended consequences of a U.S.
decision to build missile defenses.
While this article was written be-
fore the 11 September 2001
attacks on the United States, its
message remains important. The
war on terrorism will not end other
security threats, and may even
heighten longer-term concerns
over the proliferation of ballistic
missiles and the threat they could




Critics and advocates alike appear
certain about what will happen if
the United States deploys missile
defenses. For instance, critics sug-
gest missile defense cannot be
achieved with today’s technologies
and that U.S. officials will not re-
alize this until the worst possible
time: during a crisis when their
defenses are put to the test. For
some critics, defenses are all cost
and no benefit. They charge that
missile defense produces arms
races and alliance acrimony or sim-
ply will not work.2 By contrast,
NMD supporters highlight benefits
while downplaying costs or tech-
nical uncertainties. They suggest
the costs of NMD would be forgot-
ten, for example, if the system were
to stop an accidental missile launch
from hitting an American city.
One-sided estimates are unreal-
istic. At a minimum, they ignore
the opportunity costs involved in
either deploying or not deploying
missile defenses. Those involved in
political advocacy feel no compul-
sion to explain the “down side” of
their policies. Yet rarely do public
policies produce consequences
that are all good or all bad. At
most, one can say that some course
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of action will produce more good
than harm, but there is always a
price to be paid for whatever
course of action is taken. Policies
inevitably have multiple effects,
most of them unintended or unan-
ticipated.3
Two important observations
suggest it might be unusually dif-
ficult to predict the consequences
of deploying national missile de-
fense or altering the ABM Treaty.
First, because the superpowers
agreed to limit missile defenses, the
ABM Treaty constituted a de facto
global ban on missile defense. The
treaty’s effects reached across the
entire international community.
When the United States and the
Soviet Union decided not to de-
ploy missile defenses, it was
unlikely their allies would have the
political will, to say nothing of eco-
nomic or technical resources, to
develop defensive systems on their
own. Many governments have
based their foreign and defense
policies on the absence of missile
defenses. British, French, and Chi-
nese leaders, for example, could
size their offensive missile forces
knowing they would only have to
penetrate a very limited Soviet
missile defense around Moscow.
The efforts of so-called rogue
states to acquire long-range mis-
siles also are encouraged by
banning significant missile de-
fenses. The North Korean decision
to produce a limited number of
long-range missiles, for instance,
is justified only in the absence of
missile defenses.
Soviet and U.S. leaders agreed
to live with mutually assured de-
struction to avoid an expensive
arms race between offensive and
defensive systems. Other states
have been free riders on the ab-
sence of strategic defenses ever
since. With the Cold War long
over, however, the United States
has become more sensitive to the
costs of preserving this global re-
gime banning missile defenses,
especially when small, hostile re-
gimes brandish long-range missiles
armed with chemical, biological, or
nuclear warheads. Whether or not
growing U.S. disenchantment with
the ABM Treaty reflects a “unipo-
lar moment” of American global
dominance or an increasingly mul-
tipolar world is a question best
answered in hindsight.4 But the
Cold War regime banning missile
defenses is under pressure. As a
result of the attacks on the U.S.
homeland in September 2001, the
United States is more likely than
before to unilaterally improve its
strategic defenses. On the other
hand, the near-consensus of the
Western world in opposing the ter-
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rorists who perpetrated this attack,
and which led to unprecedented
international military cooperation,
may also lead to accommodation
between Russia and the United




Any effort to estimate the effect of
missile defense deployment on the
ABM Treaty and worldwide stra-
tegic relationships confronts an
immediate obstacle. There is con-
siderable uncertainty about the size
and capability of the missile de-
fense that eventually will be
deployed by the United States.
Although President Clinton de-
cided not to announce definitive
NMD plans in the final months of
his presidency, his preferences
probably would not have survived
long into the next administration.
During the 2000 presidential elec-
tion, George W. Bush described his
vision of a robust and far-reaching
missile defense system. His plan is
based on this overarching premise:
It is time to leave the
Cold War behind.
America must build ef-
fective missile defenses,
based on the best avail-
able options, at the ear-
liest possible date. Our
missile defense must be
designed to protect all
50 states—and our
friends and allies and
deployed forces over-
seas—from missile
attacks by rogue na-
tions, or accidental
launches.5
In a major policy speech in May
2001, President Bush recommitted
his administration to this path by
calling for the end of restraints on
missile defenses imposed by an
outdated treaty that no longer
served U.S. interests.6 Debate
about NMD and the relevance of
the ABM Treaty to U.S. national
security can be expected to con-
tinue long after the Bush
administration announces its mis-
sile defense plans. Given this
evolving policy and political mi-
lieu, estimates of the impact of
U.S. missile defense deployment
must consider a range of policy
options.
To respond to this uncertainty,
we explore the consequences of
three missile deployment and
treaty options. The options vary in
several ways. First, deployment
options differ in terms of the num-
ber of incoming warheads they can
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destroy and their ability to defend
U.S. territory regardless of the di-
rection of the incoming attack.
Second, they vary in terms of
where interceptors are deployed.
Third, they vary in terms of their
impact on existing strategic rela-
tionships. Some options do not
significantly interfere with the
ability of great powers to target the
United States, while others are so
extensive that they might even call
into question the situation of mu-
tual assured destruction that still
exists between the United States
and Russia. Fourth, the options
reflect different international po-
litical climates. Minimal deploy-
ments are assumed to occur in a
relatively benign diplomatic set-
ting. More ambitious missile
defense deployments are assumed
to produce international acrimony.
Although the options consid-
ered here are based on policies
under consideration or systems
under development, they reflect
general types of missile defenses
that are not entirely dependent on
specific systems. These options
vary substantially in terms of the
degree of protection they provide
to U.S. territory, as well as the
degree to which they reflect U.S.
willingness to act unilaterally to
achieve its security objectives.
Assessing the impact on U.S. se-
curity alone might not be the best
way to measure the international
impact of U.S. missile defense de-
ployment, but it does provide a
way to characterize missile de-
fenses that will remain relevant in
the years ahead.
Scenario I: Limited Defense in
a Cooperative Setting
The first scenario we consider is a
“threshold” deployment of be-
tween 20 and 100 interceptors in
a new base located in central
Alaska that would occur fairly
quickly (sometime before 2007).
This deployment option is similar
to the initial operational capability
of the missile deployment plan
(dubbed the “C1” option) ad-
vanced in the last years of the
Clinton administration. Depending
on the firing doctrine used in the
defense (the number of intercep-
tors that are fired at each incoming
warhead), the smallest threshold
system could engage a maximum
of somewhere between five and ten
warheads flying towards the
United States over the North Pa-
cific Ocean.
A threshold defense deployment
would provide the United States
with a capability to protect itself
against an accidental missile launch
or very small deliberate attacks that
approach U.S. territory, especially
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from the northwest. Such a limited
deployment poses no realistic
threat to the Russian or Chinese
ability to strike the United States
with warheads carried by intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
This option would provide the
United States with a significant
denial capability, however, against
an emerging North Korean missile
threat to American territory.
Although threshold defenses
would provide very limited capa-
bility against missile attack, they
would nevertheless pose a funda-
mental challenge to the ABM
Treaty. Estimating the impact of
any NMD deployment scheme on
the ABM Treaty is highly contin-
gent on the exact capability and
location of the missile defense de-
ployed. Moreover, the way
individual treaty articles, amend-
ments, negotiating records, and
operational histories are used to
interpret the interaction between
defensive missile systems and the
treaty greatly affects judgments
about how the treaty would need
to change to accommodate a spe-
cific system.7 It would be safe to
assume, however, that the treaty
would have to be amended to al-
low national missile defense.
Although the treaty allows the de-
ployment of a single missile
defense site, it specifies that de-
fenses need to be situated near na-
tional capitals or ICBM deployment
areas. Thus it would have to be
amended to allow construction of
the Alaskan missile defense site
and the system’s new X-band ra-
dar on Shemya Island. The treaty
also would have to be modified to
permit the use of space-based sen-
sors in the missile defense
architecture because they can sub-
stitute for ABM engagement
radars. Additionally, the treaty
would require modification be-
cause the booster for the planned
NMD interceptor is used for com-
mercial purposes; the treaty forbids
giving non-NMD systems the abil-
ity to intercept strategic missiles.
Revising the ABM Treaty to al-
low these limited missile defenses
would create some tense moments
in Russian-American relations. But
since a threshold defense would
not present a credible threat to the
Russian nuclear deterrent (even at
the reduced force levels envisioned
in a START III agreement), Rus-
sian leaders probably would want
to continue to use arms control to
constrain further U.S. defense de-
ployments. They also might find it
expedient to use ABM negotiations
to obtain concessions from the
United States on further reductions
in offensive strategic forces or for
concessions in other areas. ABM
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negotiations could be used to
move the Russian-American stra-
tegic relationship away from the
Cold War model based on mutual
vulnerability, charting a new
course in great power relations that
increases the role of defense in
some sort of mutual security ar-
rangement. Negotiations could
remain a bilateral affair, which
would greatly ease the task of
reaching a settlement. Ideally, re-
vising the ABM Treaty could lead
to improved relations between
Washington and Moscow if the
give and take over NMD led to
greater security cooperation.
In contrast, if Washington and
Moscow reached the mutual ex-
pectation that it was in the best
interest of the other side to pre-
serve the ABM Treaty it could lead
to deadlock and acrimony. Both
sides would look to their negoti-
ating partner to compromise over
NMD deployments. They might in-
terpret a lack of negotiating
progress as evidence of some po-
tentially dangerous departure in
strategic policy. We assume that
cooler heads will prevail. Russian
and U.S. negotiators will find some
way to accommodate the deploy-
ment of a modest interceptor force
within the arms control regime lim-
iting strategic defenses.
Our limited defense scenario
embodies what in fact would be a
major change in the existing arms
control regime: a negotiated
change in the ABM Treaty to per-
mit limited national missile
defenses.
Yet, our limited defense sce-
nario would not affect the bargain
at the heart of the ABM Treaty be-
cause it would not reduce the
vulnerability of the American
people to a Russian nuclear attack.
Countries with small missile arse-
nals that were seeking to use these
arsenals to gain leverage over the
United States would see the value
of their strategic investment dimin-
ished. The United States might
become more active in world af-
fairs, intervening more in regional
disputes or engaging in preventive
attacks to block missile prolifera-
tion in the developing world. This
is the sort of activity that worries
America’s European allies. They
fear that the absence of strategic
defenses will make them the logi-
cal retaliatory target following
some U.S. military action. But by
strengthening U.S. escalation
dominance, missile defenses could
increase the ability of U.S. military
forces to deter the outbreak of war.
Herein lies one of the paradoxes
of the NMD debate: Threshold C1
might undermine crisis stability
because it could embolden U.S.
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policy makers to become more in-
terventionist, while at the same
time making confrontation less
likely in the first place by strength-
ening deterrence.
The real source of international
concern about a Threshold C1 de-
ployment is that many would see
it as a harbinger of things to come.
Chinese leaders, for example, be-
lieve that the United States will
continue to enlarge its defense ca-
pabilities, diminishing the benefits
China is likely to gain from its stra-
tegic force modernization pro-
grams and making Washington
more willing to intervene in future
disputes over Taiwan. NATO allies
worry the United States might be
tempted to withdraw into a For-
tress America, even though 100
interceptors at a single site would
offer a weak defense of the battle-
ments. The sale of advanced
countermeasures to small missile
states in response to Threshold C1
deployments would do little to ease
these kinds of concerns, and could
make matters worse by increasing
pressures on U.S. policy makers to
improve their missile defenses.
Scenario II: Enhanced Defenses
and Limited Cooperation
The second scenario we consider
is more speculative, even though
it also is based on a plan proposed
by the Clinton administration (the
C3 plan) and other systems that are
already under development. In this
scenario, we expanded the Clinton
administration’s C3 proposal to
deploy 250 ground-based intercep-
tors by adding sea-based and
air-based systems currently under
development. This “C3 Plus” sys-
tem would have limited restrictions
on radars and associated command
and control networks, permitting
the maximum operational effec-
tiveness of planned national missile
defenses. It would encompass sev-
eral systems that realistically could
not be deployed before 2011, and
would provide a more robust de-
fensive capability than the
Threshold C1 system. A C3 Plus
system would greatly reduce U.S.,
and in some cases allied, vulner-
ability to missile attack. A C3 Plus
deployment might be a logical an-
swer to critics who charge that
Threshold C1 deployments come
with all of the drawbacks and few
of the potential benefits of missile
defenses. C3 Plus also includes
theater systems that were not nec-
essarily intended to defend U.S.
territory, but which could be in-
cluded in missile defenses to create
a layered defense or to supplement
NMD systems in a crisis. For ex-
ample, it might be possible to
integrate the Navy Theater Wide
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and Air Force airborne laser sys-
tems into a national missile defense
to increase its ability to defeat a
missile attack.
Capability 3 was proposed by
the Clinton administration in 1999
as a long-term option; the C3 Plus
option we describe here is based
on this proposal and reflects early
plans by the Bush administration
for a more robust missile defense.8
In our scenario, these enhanced
defenses would include intercep-
tors located in both Alaska and
Grand Forks, North Dakota. The
latter location would improve de-
fense against missiles approaching
the United States from the north-
east and would help provide
overall coverage of the United
States. If moved close enough to
an opponent’s missile field (such
as off the coast of North Korea),
the airborne laser could destroy
missiles while still in their boost
phase. Navy warships also could
be deployed off America’s shores
to bolster defenses along likely
threat axes. Given expected inter-
cept rates, C3 Plus might be able
to stop upwards of one hundred
warheads from reaching the United
States. If the United States were
to deploy a C3 Plus system, it
would have a significant impact on
the international strategic land-
scape. C3 Plus would protect the
United States from attacks
launched from a variety of direc-
tions and would “raise the bar” for
states interested in holding U.S.
urban areas at risk of ICBM attack.
Small states such as North Korea,
Iran, or Iraq would be forced to
look for alternative delivery meth-
ods to attack the United States.
Without outside technical or finan-
cial help, it would be unlikely these
small states could build or launch
enough warheads and countermea-
sures to penetrate this system.
Similarly, Chinese leaders would
face significant technical and quan-
titative challenges in any effort to
create a secure second-strike force
directed against the United States.
The enhanced capability of the
C3 Plus system would come at a
significant price in terms of arms
control. In addition to the changes
made to accommodate a Thresh-
old C1 deployment, the ABM
Treaty would have to be amended
to allow for construction of two
ground-based interceptor sites and
to allow air-based and sea-based
NMD.
A C3 Plus system would have
its greatest impact by challenging
China’s quest to modernize its stra-
tegic nuclear forces, eliminating
China’s free ride on Russian-
American cooperation in limiting
missile defenses. A vigorous Chi-
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nese response to these deploy-
ments could set off a chain reac-
tion in Asia affecting Indian,
Pakistani, Japanese, and Taiwan-
ese defensive doctrines and
deployments. Chinese efforts to
complicate the defense problems
faced by U.S. policy makers by
providing advanced missile or
weapon technologies to America’s
adversaries also could destroy the
nonproliferation regime.
C3 Plus would strain the inter-
national arms control regime
because it would be difficult to
construct a treaty that would curb
the break-out potential inherent in
such a robust defense deployment.
If Russian and American offensive
forces continue to decline in num-
bers, a C3 Plus system might be
expanded rapidly to deny Russians
the ability to hold U.S. targets at
risk. Moreover, Chinese officials
would have an interest in the de-
tails of a renegotiated treaty
because they would want to dis-
cern exactly how a new treaty
might interact with their plans for
modernizing their strategic forces.
An ABM Treaty that accommo-
dated a C3 Plus system might have
to become multilateral. But it
would be difficult to construct a
multilateral arms control treaty of
sufficient issue depth to restrict
missile defenses in a meaningful
way. Russian officials might coop-
erate in renegotiating the ABM
Treaty under these circumstances,
but the negotiations could be a
source of acrimony unless a politi-
cal agreement to integrate defenses
into the Russian-American strate-
gic relationship existed.
Revising the ABM Treaty to per-
mit a C3 Plus deployment probably
would strain Russian-American
cooperation in arms control to the
breaking point. Although it would
still be in Russia’s interest to con-
strain U.S. missile defense
deployments in an arms control
agreement, critics might correctly
charge that a C3 Plus system
would provide the United States
with a break-out capability. In
other words, by quickly adding in-
terceptors to an existing defense
architecture, U.S. forces could
greatly reduce Russian second-
strike capabilities against the
United States. No matter what the
final outcome, Russian-American
treaty negotiations to allow a C3
Plus deployment would be highly
acrimonious. Even if an agreement
about the treaty were finally
reached, Russian leaders might
believe that they had been strong-
armed by their American
counterparts.
Supporters of robust missile
deployments would object to this
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pessimistic picture of the diplo-
matic consequences of a U.S.
decision to deploy a C3 Plus sys-
tem. Bush administration officials
might suggest that robust missile
defenses could eliminate deter-
rence as the cornerstone of
Russian-American strategic rela-
tions. C3 Plus could serve as the
basis of a cooperative transition to
a world where defense is dominant
and offensive systems are reduced
in number and capability. Robust
defenses could help Russians and
Americans alike finally put the
Cold War behind them. For NMD
advocates, C3 Plus is a logical re-
sponse to the emerging threats
facing the United States.
Scenario III: Unlimited De-
fenses, Unconstrained by Treaty
The third scenario assumes U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
—a scenario much more likely
since the Bush administration took
office and the attacks on the U.S.
homeland. Defense deployments
would no longer be constrained by
an arms control regime. The op-
portunity to increase Russian-
American cooperation by creating
a revised arms control regime is
unlikely to emerge under these cir-
cumstances.
U.S. officials would be free to
deploy whatever weapons or sen-
sors they considered necessary or
technologically feasible. In all
probability, they would attempt to
deploy robust defenses as soon as
possible—otherwise why would
they be eager to eliminate the ABM
Treaty? But given the long lead
times involved, it might be nearly
two decades before revolutionary
kinds of systems, for example the
space-based laser, can be deployed.
It is difficult to say, however, how
effective advanced defenses might
be given the performance uncer-
tainties about even limited defenses
based on relatively proven tech-
nologies.
The end of the ABM Treaty
would signify that U.S. policy
makers, or Russian leaders for that
matter, had decided that unilateral
measures offered a path preferable
to cooperation as a means of guar-
anteeing their national security.
Alternatively, an abrupt end to the
ABM Treaty might be caused by
some diplomatic failure produced
by domestic political pressures or
miscalculation. But a U.S. decision
to withdraw from or abrogate the
treaty also could be a response to
an abrupt change in the strategic
environment. In this case, an end
to the ABM Treaty would consti-
tute a consequence rather than a
primary cause of changes in the
international system.
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Arms race and crisis instability
could become commonplace in a
world of strategic defenses left
unconstrained by any treaty, or in
the absence of a new consensus
among the great powers about the
role of defenses in national secu-
rity. Russia might decide that the
effort to run an arms race with the
United States was not worth the
cost and find some new basis for
Russian-American strategic rela-
tions. Equally likely, however,
would be a Russian decision to join
with China in a diplomatic cam-
paign to resist American unilateral-
ism. Sentiments among NATO al-
lies probably would swing between
the traditional fears of abandon-
ment and entrapment. U.S. allies
in Asia might work quickly to in-
tegrate their defenses into an
emerging U.S. defense architecture
to protect themselves against an in-
creasingly suspicious China. Small
states such as Pakistan, Iraq, North
Korea, Israel, and Iran might try
to improve their offensive and de-
fensive missile capabilities by
capitalizing on a resulting break-
down in the Missile Technology
Control Regime or the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. In sum,
the United States could find its real
security actually diminished de-
spite the deployment of robust
defenses.
RECURRING THEMES IN
THE DEBATE ABOUT NMD
AND TREATY REVISION
Our analysis identified several un-
expected observations about the
strategic situation facing national
governments at the dawn of the
twenty-first century. First, unin-
tended consequences would follow
not only in the wake of efforts to
modify the ABM Treaty, but also
by continuing to abide by a treaty
that no longer reflects strategic or
technical realities. For example,
theater ballistic missiles have
grown more capable in the 30 years
since the treaty was signed, but the
restrictions placed by the ABM
Treaty on national missile defenses
are beginning to impede the effort
to develop theater missile defenses.
While many hoped that the ABM
Treaty would be a “living docu-
ment” that could be adapted to
changing technical and strategic
circumstances, that hope has not
been realized. The proliferation of
theater offensive capability, defen-
sive responses to meet that
capability, and the technological
advances that made such responses
possible, all combine to raise treaty
conflicts. Today the United States
is prevented from responding to
threats that did not exist when the
treaty was signed, but it is difficult
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to imagine that the ABM bargain
with the Soviets really was in-
tended to leave Americans
vulnerable to a North Korean mis-
sile threat. The key questions are
whether the objectives the treaty
was intended to meet are still valid
as we enter the twenty-first cen-
tury, and whether the treaty can be
modified to meet legitimate secu-
rity concerns now that the Cold
War is over.
Second, while most observers
agree national missile defenses will
enhance U.S. power projection
capabilities, they disagree about
the political and strategic conse-
quences that will flow from this
new capability. Would the deploy-
ment of missile defenses enhance
isolationist tendencies within the
United States, as the European al-
lies fear, or allow America to
intervene more readily in interna-
tional disputes, as China and many
other states believe? Limited NMD
capabilities would increase the
ability of the United States to
project power into regional trouble
spots with less fear of retaliation,
but it is uncertain whether this
would have a positive or negative
affect on the course of international
relations.9 Moreover, the impact of
defense deployments will vary de-
pending on the amount of offensive
missile capability possessed by
potential U.S. opponents. Ulti-
mately, the diplomatic path to
deployment, reflected in efforts to
renegotiate the ABM Treaty, may
have a greater impact on crisis and
arms race stability than the specific
capabilities of U.S. missile de-
fenses.
Third, modifying the ABM
Treaty and deploying theater and
national missile defenses eventu-
ally will be viewed primarily as an
Asian issue. Reactions in China to
the possibility that Chinese strate-
gic force modernization might no
longer be able to capitalize on
Russian-American security coop-
eration raise the possibility that
U.S. NMD deployments could lead
to a cascading effect in the Asia-
Pacific region as China’s neighbors
react to Beijing’s security deci-
sions. NMD proponents and
opponents both neglect the serious
ramifications of their decisions in
far-away parts of the globe. South
Asia is the region most likely to
experience a cascading effect fol-
lowing a U.S. decision to deploy
NMD. Japan and Taiwan also
would have to adjust their defense
policies to reflect any American
decision. For better or worse, U.S.
NMD deployments and changes to
the arms control regime govern-
ing strategic defenses are likely to
clarify Chinese national security
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objectives in the years ahead.
These decisions may not be to
Washington’s liking. China, after
all, sees a dark side to U.S. plans
to deploy NMD, one that includes
U.S. desires for global hegemony
and an overt U.S. campaign to
stem China’s emergence as a great
power. The United States needs to
decide whether it considers China
a “Little Russia” or a “Big Rogue.”
If the former, then the United
States should accept China’s effort
to develop a secure retaliatory ca-
pability for reasons of stability
along the classic deterrence
model.10 If the latter, however, then




The United States finds itself on
the horns of a dilemma. On the one
hand, it can seek to increase its
security through largely unilateral
action, but at the risk of a harsh
international response. The arms
race and crisis instability unleashed
by highly capable defenses de-
ployed in the absence of a revised
ABM Treaty probably would un-
dermine America’s strategic
position over the long term. Given
the likely international ramifica-
tions, are deploying missile
defenses and modifying the ABM
Treaty worth the modest protec-
tion NMD will provide? On the
other hand, can the United States
avoid defense deployments given
the proliferation of ballistic missile
threats and domestic demands for
protection? No matter how policy
makers attempt to resolve this mis-
sile defense dilemma, real choices
will have to be made concerning
strategic interests that consider the
long-term international conse-
quences of U.S. decisions.
Although Bush administration
officials suggest missile defenses
can be used to help transform stra-
tegic relationships, what is missing
from today’s debate about NMD is
a vision of how U.S. policy mak-
ers will use arms control and
national missile defense to shape
the future international security
environment. NMD supporters are
correct to claim that the missile
threat is growing and that the bar-
gain at the heart of the ABM Treaty
is nearly obsolete. But this chang-
ing threat environment does not
justify abandoning formal and uni-
lateral arms control initiatives that
can pave the way for the strategic
transformation envisioned by the
Bush administration. The fact that
today’s proponents of NMD are
often yesterday’s arms control crit-
ics is regrettable, because old
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biases can blind officials when it
comes to the important role arms
control can play in legitimizing
missile defense deployments. Arms
control negotiations can provide a
forum to communicate military
concerns and to explain changes in
force structure and doctrine that
will inevitably occur in the future.
It can help concerned states repeat-
edly adjust not only their forces,
but strategic concepts and plans as
missile defenses become increas-
ingly robust. By contrast, a prompt
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty would send a shock wave
throughout the international com-
munity, causing unforeseen and
negative consequences in the de-
cades ahead.
The United States should de-
ploy missile defenses that provide
modest protection of the Ameri-
can homeland, deployed forces,
and possibly allies. Exactly what
sort of system will be deployed—
a few dozen ground based
interceptors, a sea-based system,
or even the airborne laser—re-
mains a matter of conjecture. But
limited defenses make strategic
and diplomatic sense. A modest
missile defense system would
stretch the current technological
limits without breaking them, can
remain fiscally viable, and would
allow the United States to ap-
proach Russia with a proposal to
renegotiate the ABM Treaty to al-
low for theater and limited national
missile defenses in a cooperative
defensive regime. This negotiation
process might even be broadened
beyond a bilateral arrangement to
include other key states in a multi-
lateral forum, one that could lead
to a successful transition to a world
in which missile defenses have a
role to play in maintaining inter-
national stability.
NMD highlights the danger of
making policy decisions without
considering immediate interna-
tional reactions or longer-term
systemic consequences. The de-
bate over missile defenses focuses
on current threats and technical
challenges. But deployment deci-
sions and treaty negotiations have
to take into account the strategic
setting 20 years from now, when
robust defense systems become
fully operational. Too often, both
critics and supporters treat the de-
cision to deploy missile defenses
as an end in itself, not part of a tran-
sition to a new, more cooperative
security framework. If it fails to
foster this transition, the United
States will find itself either wed-
ded to an increasingly irrelevant
arms control treaty or saddled with
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potentially ineffective and pro-
vocative missile defenses.
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